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SECTION EIGHT, PIPEDA, AND THE PROBLEM 
OF SHIFTING NORMS: A CASE FOR A 
CONTRACT MODEL OF DATA PRIVACY 
INTRODUCTION
?
In recent years, governmental and private entities have engaged in 
unprecedented data-collection practices.1 Edward Snowden’s 2013 leak 
regarding the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata program was only the “tip of 
the iceberg” when viewed alongside the burgeoning private marketplace for 
personal data.2 Today, “Big Data” firms comprise a multi-billion-dollar 
industry in which personal information is “bartered and sold” to the highest 
bidder.3 Low access-costs of social media sites, blogs, and other forms of 
internet media ensure a constant flow of personal information that firms 
collect and analyze to create “full-scale psychological profile[s]” of 
consumers.4 According to the International Data Corporation, the “global 
volume of data” will double every two years and, at its current trajectory, 
will balloon to over “40 trillion gigabytes” by 2020.5
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1. See Jason M. Weinstein, William L. Drake & Nicholas P. Silverman, Privacy vs. Public Safety: 
Prosecuting and Defending Criminal Cases in the Post-Snowden Era, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 729, 732 
(2015); Lee Raine & Shiva Maniam, Americans Feel the Tensions Between Privacy and Security 
Concerns, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/02/19/americans-feel-the-tensions-between-privacy-and-security-concerns.
2.  Stephen I. Vladeck, Big Data Before and After Snowden, 7 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y
333, 339 (2014); Gavin Skok, Establishing a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in Clickstream Data, 6 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 61, 64-67 (2000).  
3.  Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information 
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1407 (2001); see Max N. Helveston, Consumer Protection in the Age 
of Big Data, 93 WASH. U.L. REV. 859, 867-69 (2016) (“Given the novelty of Big Data-informed 
analytics, the public is largely unaware of the rapid growth of the data industry and the extent to which 
individuals' personal information has become a commodity that is transferred among private and public 
entities”); EXECUTIVE OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING
VALUES (2014) (at 50, “[Private information] is bought, bartered, traded, and sold. An entire industry 
now exists to commoditize the conclusions drawn from that data.”);  
At the broadest level, we are building an Internet that is on its face free to 
use, but is in reality funded by billions of transactions where advertisements are 
individually targeted at Internet users based upon detailed profiles of their 
reading and consumer habits. Such “behavioral advertising” is a multibillion-
dollar business, and is the foundation on which the successes of companies like 
Google and Facebook have been built. 
Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1938 (2013) (internal 
citations omitted). 
4.  Solove, supra note 3, at 1404; see Jacques Bughin, Michael Chui, and James Manyika, Clouds,
Big Data, and Smart Assets: Ten Tech-Enabled Business Trends to Watch, McKinsey Quarterly 7-8 
(2010), available at http://www.itglobal-services.de/files/100810_McK_Clouds_big_data_and% 20sm- 
art%20assets.pdf.
5.  IDC Big Data and Business Analytics Forum 2013: Leveraging Data for Agile Business, INT’L
DATA CORP. (Nov. 26, 2013), http://idc-cema.com/eng/events/50534-idc-big-data-and-business-anal-
ytics-forum-2013.
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Canada has struggled to adapt its privacy law to the Big Data 
paradigm. While the Personal Information Protection and Electronic 
Documents Act (“PIPEDA”)6 has enhanced data security among users and 
service providers, the act has done little to restrict or establish coherent 
parameters for information sharing among service providers and law 
enforcement agencies.7 Judicial enforcement of Section Eight of the Charter 
of Canadian Rights and Freedoms (“Section Eight”),8 moreover, has had 
limited effect in carving out expectations of privacy independent of existing 
legislative and regulatory frameworks.9 Without this independence, the 
courts neglect their duty under Section Eight to judicially review statutes 
that intrude on reasonable expectations of privacy.10
The difficulty Canadian lawmakers and courts face when crafting 
data privacy protections stems not so much from identifying minimal 
privacy standards as it does from wide variations in data privacy norms.11
Social media users, for example, vary significantly in the types of 
information they are willing to share online.12 For those who broadcast 
personal (perhaps incriminating) details about their lives to large groups of 
individuals online, society’s need to prosecute crime probably outweighs 
the need to recognize those individuals’ privacy interests.13 But the calculus 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 6.  Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (hereinafter 
referred to as “PIPEDA”), S.C. 2000, c. 5 (Can.). 
 7.  See Graham Mayeda, Privacy in the Age of the Internet: Lawful Access 
Provisions and Access to ISP and OSP Subscriber Information, 53 ALTA. L. REV. 709, 714-15 (2016); 
Matthew Nied, Cloud Computing, the Internet, and the Charter Right to Privacy: The Effect of Terms of 
Service Agreements on Reasonable Expectations of Privacy, 69 ADVOC. VANCOUVER 701, 702-05 
(2011); Daphne Gilbert, Ian R. Kerr, and Jena McGill, The Medium and the Message: Personal Privacy 
and the Forced Marriage of Police and Telecommunications Providers, 51 CRIM. L. Q. 469, 472 (2007). 
 8.  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 8, Part I of Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, c 11 (U.K.). (hereinafter referred to as “Section Eight”).
9.  See generally R v. Spencer, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212, paras. 53-67 (Can.); R. v. 
Gomboc, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 211, para.31 (Can.); R. v. Mahmood, 2008 CanLII 51774, para. 56 (ON SC). 
 10.  Mayeda, supra note 7, at 46-48. 
 11.  Many commentators have noted a “privacy paradox,” or the discontinuity 
between people’s general desire for privacy, on the one hand, and their seemingly incongruous 
willingness to share private information. See H. Brian Holland, Privacy Paradox 2.0, 19 WIDENER L.J. 
893, 893-94 (2010). The paradox demonstrates that at least for some people the convenience and 
adaptability of online communications (e.g. social media, email, blogging, etc.) might outweigh the value 
of increased privacy protections. See Stephanos Bibas, A Contractual Approach to Data Privacy, 17 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 591, 597, 603-04 (1994); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 41
(2008) (“Privacy is a product of norms, activities, and legal protections, and as a result, it is culturally 
and historically contingent.”). 
 12.  Patricia Sánchez Abril, Private Ordering: A Contractual Approach to Online 
Personal Privacy, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689, 698 (2010) (“Some social media participants 
covetously guard their privacy; the more conspicuous display an urge to divulge everything about 
themselves”) (internal quotations omitted); see Solove, supra note 11 at 41. 
 13.  See Richard Posner, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 233-239 (1981) (highlighting 
that greater privacy creates a social cost of insulating bad behavior and allows people to have more 
opportunities to manipulate each other); R. v. Laurin, 1997 CanLII 775m para. 41 (Can. ON CA) (quoting 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even 
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); see generally Brewer v. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss3/9
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becomes much less clear for individuals who use online technology to 
communicate with people they know and trust.14 Even among those who 
share minimal personal information online, the trivial details they do share 
can become comprehensive biographies when aggregated by third-party 
service providers.15 Law enforcement agents can then use these biographies 
to investigate and prosecute individuals for a wide-array of criminal 
conduct.16
The Supreme Court of Canada has begun to develop a promising 
jurisprudence based on a contractual right of privacy.17 Faced with the 
prospect of adapting normative constraints to the increasingly more 
complex and wide-scale data collection practices, the court has begun to 
utilize privacy policies a user assents to as an indication of the user’s 
reasonable privacy expectations.18 Contract law, which potentially allows 
parties to negotiate constraints on privacy, is well-suited to handle 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 416-17 (1977) (Burger, J. dissenting) (repudiating a “sporting theory of criminal 
justice,” or one that views the Fourth Amendment as a substantive protection a defendant can assert to 
escape criminal liability). 
14.  In American jurisprudence, a person loses his or her privacy interest in information he or she 
shares with a third-party because, in sharing the information, the person has assumed the risk the 
information will be disclosed to law enforcement. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) 
(holding that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bank records); United 
States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427–28 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that defendant did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in historical cell-site location data since the defendant voluntarily 
disclosed his location data to cellular providers by using his phone); United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. 
Supp. 2d 523, 525-527 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that a Facebook user loses a privacy expectation with 
respect to information he or she shares to a Facebook friend). Canadian courts have largely rejected this 
doctrine. R. v. Cole, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 53, paras. 77-78 (Can.). Richard Epstein, moreover, offers a 
compelling critique of the doctrine. Richard Epstein, Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons from the 
Common Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1199 (2009). Epstein argues that 
mere knowledge that one takes the risk that information can be exposed does not mean that one has 
assumed such risk. Id. at 1204. To reach the latter conclusion the individual would have to have some 
meaningful way to bargain about the risk he or she assumed. Id.; see William Baude & James Y. Stern, 
The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1872-74 (2016). 
15.  Solove, supra note 3, at 1404; Craig Forcese, Law, Logarithms, and Liberties: Legal Issues 
Arising from CSE’s Metadata Collection Initiatives, in LAW, PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE IN CANADA
IN THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA 127, 129-32 (Michael Geist ed., 2015); see Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 
2473, 2491 (2014) (holding that, absent exigent circumstances, the government could not search a cell 
phone incident to a lawful arrest because, unlike more traditional items of property, a cell phone 
“contains a broad array of private information.”); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956-
57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J. concurring) (questioning the continued viability of the third-party doctrine in 
the digital age). 
16.  See Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, The Age of Predictive Analytics: From 
Patterns to Predictions (2012), available at https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/1753/ pa_201208_e.pdf. 
17.  Cole, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, para. 52 (Can.); see cases cited supra note 9; R. v. Cuttell, 2009 
ONCJ 471 (CanLII). Some American courts have suggested a similar principle. In United States v. 
Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 2010), for example, the Sixth Circuit stated that there may be 
circumstances in which a “subscriber agreement” is broad enough to defeat a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.
18.  Cole, [2012] 3 S.C.R., para. 52; see cases cited supra note 9; Cuttell, supra note 17. 
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variations in the types of information people want to keep private.19 So long 
as the law provides users opportunities to bargain over terms in their 
policies, a contract law framework can protect reasonable privacy 
expectations among users with diverse privacy preferences.20
This Note will proceed in two parts. In Part I, I will explain the 
current statutory and constitutional data privacy law in Canada. In Part II, 
I will set forth several recommendations about how courts and the 
legislature can create a framework in which terms of use and privacy policy 
terms can provide sufficient notice to users and allow them to have more 
meaningful bargaining power in negotiating privacy terms. Because 
Canadian and American search and seizure law both utilize the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test in determining whether a search or seizure is 
reasonable, this Note will often cite American cases that support similar 
principles in case and statutory law. However, the principal focus of this 
Note is Canadian privacy law. 
PART I: EXISTING LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR DATA PRIVACY
?
A.? Personal Information Protection & Electronic Documents Act 
(“PIPEDA”) 
?
PIPEDA regulates the private sector’s collection, use and 
disclosure of personal information in the course of commercial 
activities.21 The Canadian Parliament passed PIPEDA primarily to ensure 
compliance with Article 25 of the European Union’s Directive on Data 
Protection (“the Directive”),22 which was necessary to preserve important 
trade relations with European Union (EU) members.23 For this reason, the 
Directive can be viewed as a prototype of PIPEDA’s core features. The 
Directive regulates data sharing among member and non-member states 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
19.  See Abril, supra note 12, at 704; Bibas, supra note 11, at 597, 603-604. 
20.  See Abril, supra note 12, at 714-715. 
21.  R. v. Ward, (2012) 112 O.R. (3d) 321, para. 40 (Can. Ont. C.A.); see Tariq Ahmad, Online 
Privacy Law: Canada, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/online-privacy-
law/canada.php.
22.  Council Directive 95/46, art.25, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) (hereinafter referred to as “The 
Directive.”). Article 25(1) states in pertinent part: 
The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third country of 
personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing 
after transfer may take place only if, without prejudice to compliance with the 
national provisions adopted pursuant to the other provisions of this Directive, the 
third country in question ensures an adequate level of protection. 
23.  See Josh Nisker, PIPEDA: A Constitutional Analysis, 85 LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN
317, 318 (2006); Avner Levin & Mary Jo Nicholson, Privacy Law in the United States, the EU and 
Canada: The Allure of the Middle Ground, 2 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 357, 379 (2005). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss3/9
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and establishes an array of privacy principles for the collection of personal 
data.24 These include rules on the processing of data, as well as 
requirements that service providers limit data collection to legitimate 
purposes,25 obtain consent for personal data collection,26 and allow users 
access to the data that service providers have collected.27 Additionally, the 
Directive prohibits member EU states from sharing information with non-
member countries whose data privacy laws do not provide users an 
“adequate level of protection.”28
The Directive is significant in part for its limitations.29 Since its 
primary focus is on the processing of information, the Directive’s 
provisions relate to obligations imposed on data controllers and not to the 
protection of users’ data ownership rights.30 The Directive, moreover, 
allows member and complying non-member states to create a law 
enforcement exception to most of its data protections.31 In crafting 
PIPEDA, the Canada national assembly incorporated the Directive’s 
central provisions.32 PIPEDA “recommends” that service providers 
explain the purpose for why they collect personal data, seek express 
consent when information is likely sensitive, develop a data retention 
policy, and account for third parties to whom they share information.33
Like the Directive, PIPEDA also eschews recognition of a customer’s 
ownership rights in his or her personal information, as service providers 
may collect, use, or disclose personal information according to an 
overarching reasonableness principle.34 This reasonableness mandate, 
however, has not been interpreted as applying constraints on prospective 
uses of information. 35 PIPEDA, therefore, does not prohibit service 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
24.  Nisker, supra note 23, at 318. 
25.  See The Directive, art. 7 
26.  Id.
27.  Id. at art. 12-13 
28.  Id. at art. 25
29.  See James R. Maxeiner, Freedom of Information and the EU Data Protection Directive, 48
FED. COMM. L. J. 93, 97 (1995). 
30.  Id.
31.  Id. at 103; The Directive, art. 13 
32.  Pursuant to Article 29 of the Directive, the EU Data Protection Working Party assessed 
whether PIPEDA ensured “adequate” data privacy protections. The Data Protection Working Party issued 
an opinion in 2001 that PIPEDA met the Directive standards. See Opinion 2/2001 on the Adequacy of 
the Canadian Personal Information and Electric Documents Act, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2001/wp39_en.pdf; see
Mahmud Jamal, Is PIPEDA Constitutional?, 43 CAN.BUS. L. J. 434, 438-39 (2006). 
33. PIPEDA, S.C. 2000, c.5, Sched.1, 4.2.3,5; 4.3.5,6; 4.5.2 (Can.). 
34. PIPEDA,  S.C. 2000, c.5, s.5(3) (Can.); Agathon Fric, Access of Evil? Legislating Online 
Youth Privacy in the Information Age, 12 CAN. J. L. & TECH. 141, 152 (2014). 
35.  Turner v. Telus Communications Inc., [2007] F.C.A. 21, para. 15; see Fric, supra note 34, at 
155.
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providers from using novel technologies to generate more complete 
biographies of users based on data they previously disclosed.36
While the scope of PIPEDA’s data protections is quite broad, it 
contains numerous collection, use and disclosure exceptions that 
constrain its privacy protections. First, PIPEDA’s provisions are limited 
to commercial data collection.37 In McKesson v. Teamsters,38 the Ontario 
Arbitration court held that an employer who caught an employee’s 
absence by “surreptitiously” making a video recording of him off-site did 
not violate PIPEDA because such monitoring was not made “in the course 
of commercial activities.”39 Second, while PIPEDA generally restricts 
service providers from collecting sensitive personal information from 
users, Section 7(1)(b) allows service providers to collect information 
without obtaining the subject’s consent if they reasonably believe that: 
(1) obtaining consent would “compromise the availability…of the 
information” and (2) the information is of a type that could reasonably be 
expected to aid in investigating a “breach of an agreement or a 
contravention of the laws of Canada or a province.” 40 Third, PIPEDA 
contains a contains a broad voluntary disclosure provision. Under Section 
7(3)(c.1)(ii), a service provider may disclose personal information to a 
government agent who has “lawful authority” and who requests 
information: (1) relating to national security, (2) necessary for 
investigating and enforcing any breach of federal or provincial law, or (3) 
necessary to administer any federal or provincial law.
In Spencer, the Court had an opportunity to assess the meaning 
of “lawful authority” under 7(3)(c.1).41 Rather than interpreting the 
provision as enhancing law enforcement’s investigatory capabilities, the 
Court held that the provision merely codified the police’s traditional, 
investigatory powers, including the authority of police to conduct a search 
in exigent circumstances.42 The scope of PIPEDA’s disclosure 
provisions, however, remains unclear in the wake of Spencer. Unlike the 
United States’ Stored Communications Act (SCA), PIPEDA does not 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
36. See Fric, supra note 34, at 157.
37. PIPEDA, S.C. 2000, c.5, 4(1)(a); Chris D.L. Hunt, The Common Law’s Hodgepodge 
Protection of Privacy, 66 U.N.B. L.J. 161, 181 (2015). 
38.  McKesson Canada v. Teamsters, [2004] 136 L.A.C. (4th) 102 (Can.).  
39.  Id. at paras. 3, 39 (“[T]he definition of ‘commercial activity’ under PIPEDA, while broad, 
is not in my view so wide-ranging that it encompasses the employment relationship itself and in 
particular the collection, use and disclosure of personal information within the organization.”).
40. PIPEDA, S.C. 2000, c.5, Sch. 1, 4.3.4 (Can.); Arthur J. Cockfield, Who Watches the 
Watchers? A Law and Technology Perspective on Government and Private Sector Surveillance, 29 
QUEEN’S L.J. 364, 379 (2003).  
41. R v. Spencer, [2014] 2 S.C.R. at paras. 68-74. 
42.  Id.; R. v. Ward, [2012] 112 O.R. (3d) 321, para. 46 (stating “PIPEDA does not create any 
police search and seizure powers” but “sets out the circumstances in which organizations may lawfully 
choose to disclose personal customer information, which must normally be kept confidential, to third 
parties including, in some circumstances, the police”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss3/9
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distinguish between content and non-content data.43 Under the SCA, 
service providers can only voluntarily disclose non-content subscriber 
information except in emergencies, with the suspect’s consent or pursuant 
to a court order or warrant.44 Since PIPEDA’s provisions does not make 
this distinction, Canadian courts assume the onus of gauging a user’s 
privacy interest in particular types of information in a particular context.45
B.? Constitutional Privacy Protections under Section Eight 
?
Section Eight protects individuals from unreasonable searches 
and seizures.46 Like other Charter provisions, Section Eight is the 
supreme law of Canada that renders null and void any federal or provincial 
laws inconsistent with it.47 In Canada v. Southam, Inc., the Supreme Court 
of Canada judicially interpreted Section Eight for the first time.48 Taking 
into account the relatively mature American search and seizure law at the 
time, the Court elected to interpret Section Eight according to the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” (“REP”) test set forth in Katz v. 
United States. 49 In Katz, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
Fourth Amendment search occurs when law enforcement intrudes upon a 
subjective privacy expectation that society would find objectively 
reasonable. 50
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
43.  PIPEDA defines personal information as “information about an identifiable individual” not 
including “the name, title or business address or telephone number of an employee of an organization.” 
S.C. 2000, c.5, 2(1). The SCA defines non-content data as:  
“(A) name; (B) address; (C) local and long distance telephone connection 
records, or records of session times and durations; (D) length of service 
(including start date) and types of service utilized; (E) telephone or instrument 
number or other subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily 
assigned network address; and (F) means and source of payment for such service 
(including any credit card or bank account number….”
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2)(A)-(F) (2010). 
44.  18 U.S.C. § 2702(c), 2703(a), (b). See Dan Grice & Dr. Bryan Schwartz, Social
Incrimination: How North American Courts Are Embracing Social Network Evidence in Criminal and 
Civil Trials, 36 MAN. L.J. 221, 234-35 (2012) (stating that the SCA disclosure limitations are much 
stricter than PIPEDA’s.).
45.  PIPEDA, S.C. 2000, c.5, 2(1). 
46. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 8, Part I of Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
47.  Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, Part I, §52(1) (U.K.). 
48.  Canada v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (Can.). 
49.  Id. at para. 24-26.  
50. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1961).  
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Canadian courts have consistently held that Section Eight imposes 
normative rather than descriptive constraints on law enforcement.51 Thus,
the reasonableness of a search or seizure is not dependent on the 
defendant’s actual or constructive knowledge of the degree of privacy he 
enjoys.52 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada has largely rejected the 
“risk analysis” that is prominently featured in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.53 In R v. Sanelli, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada 
held that law enforcement violated Section Eight when an undercover 
officer wearing a wire surreptitiously recorded an incriminating 
conversation with the defendant in the latter’s apartment.54 In so holding, 
the Court was careful to draw a distinction between a defendant’s 
disclosure of incriminating information to a third party and law 
enforcement’s recording of such information during the conversation.55
While Section Eight does not protect individuals against “tattletales,” it 
does prohibit law enforcement from covertly making warrantless 
recordings of a defendant’s words and sharing those words with others.56
In the latter scenario, the police unlawfully intrude upon the defendant’s 
right to direct his words to particular individuals or groups.57
The Court reiterated this principle in R v. Wong when it held that 
law enforcement violated Section Eight when they cooperated with hotel 
staff to install a wire in a room the defendant publicly advertised and used 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
51.  Whether the subjective element in the REP test has any independent significance is unclear. 
A simple thought experiment will frame the issue. Suppose the government provides the public advanced 
warning that it intends to conduct comprehensive electronic surveillance that day. See United States v. 
Kim, 415 F.Supp. 1252, 1256-57 (D. Haw. 1976). If a defendant viewed the broadcast and is later arrested 
that day, he or she cannot assert a subjective privacy interest in items revealed through electronic 
surveillance. Id. However, this outcome would clearly conflict with the stated purpose of Section Eight 
to provide normative constraints on law enforcement. See R. v. Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, para. 42 
(Can.) (“The subjective expectation of privacy is important but its absence should not be used too quickly 
to undermine the protection afforded [Section Eight] to the values of a free and democratic society.”). 
52.  Recent Canadian opinions suggest that the subjective prong of the REP test has been reduced 
to a factor in the objective test. In Spencer, the Court stated that the REP test depends on weighing a 
“large number of interrelated factors” that include factors “related to the nature of the privacy interest” 
and factors that directly measure the expectation of privacy “both subjectively and objectively.” Spencer,
[2014] 2 S.C.R, para. 18. Professor Orin Kerr has argued that the Katz court intended a subjective 
expectation of privacy to signify the loss of privacy interests when a person discloses information to a 
third-party. Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. 113 (2015). When such a disclosure occurs, at least under American law, the party assumes 
the risk that a third-party will disclose that information to law enforcement. Id. See also Anthony G. 
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 (1974); Alexandre 
Genest, Privacy as Construed During the Tessling Era: Revisiting the  “Totality of t- he Circumstances 
Test,” Standing and Third Party Rights, 41 R.J.T. 337, 350-58 (2007). 
53.  See supra note 14; compare R v. Sanelli, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, paras. 14-19 (Can.) (rejecting 
the third-party risk analysis of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence) with United States v. White, 401 U.S. 
745, 752 (1971); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).  
54. Sanelli, [1990] 1 S.C.R., para. 4. 
55. Id. at paras. 23-24. 
56. Id. at paras. 30-32. 
57. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss3/9
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as an illegal gaming house.58 The lower court denied that a search had 
occurred because the defendant could not reasonably expect he would be 
left alone after he extended indiscriminate invitations to the public.59 The 
Supreme Court of Canada, however, found that the surveillance violated 
Section Eight.60 It reasoned that a hotel room is a context in which 
members of the public would feel secure from surveillance.61 Moreover, 
the Court reaffirmed the holding of Sanelli when it stated that an intrusion 
of a heightened magnitude occurred when police made recordings of the 
defendant’s spoken words. 62
Sanelli and Wong are notable attempts to detach an individual’s 
privacy rights with his or her status as a property owner. In Sanelli the
defendant lacked a cognizable property interest in the apartment where the 
officer recorded the conversation63 and in Wong the defendant kept his 
hotel room largely open to the public and used it as a “floating gambling 
house.” 64 While these decisions generally support a notion of Section 
Eight as a personal rather than property right, the privacy interests at stake 
are nonetheless tethered to discrete spaces like the telephone booth in 
Katz.65 Orin Kerr has noted that, despite rhetoric that the REP test exists 
independently of property rights, courts have been “fairly consistent” in 
anchoring privacy norms to privacy zones limited by clear geographical 
boundaries.66 Judicial adherence to interpreting Section Eight in terms of 
privacy zones is not merely a product of slow changes in law. Rather, it 
reflects the limited ability of judges to determine a right to exclude—a 
critical facet of privacy law— without identifying tangible property over 
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58. R v. Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36 (Can.).
59. Id. at para. 17. 
60. Id. at para. 24. 
61. Id. at paras. 20-21. 
62. Id. at para. 23. R v. Russell, [2012] BCSC 652, paras. 34-35 (Can.) (“Section 8 of the Charter
is directed to the protection of the security of the person, not the protection of his property.”); R v. 
Belnavis [1996], 29 O.R. (3d) 321, para. 38 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
63.  Sanelli, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at para. 4. 
64.  Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at para. 2.
65.  See R. v. Edwards, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128, paras. 47-48 (Can.) (finding that police did not violate 
defendant’s privacy rights when they searched his girlfriend’s apartment without a warrant because he 
was “just a visitor” at that apartment and did not “contribute to the rent or household expenses”); David 
J. Schwartz, Edwards and Belnavis: Front and Rear Door Exceptions to the Right to be Secure from 
Unreasonable Search and Seizure (1997) 
10 C.R. (5th) 100 (stating that Edwards contradicts the Supreme Court of Canada’s earlier precedent 
suggesting that “a reasonable expectation of privacy is not linked to the ability to assert a property 
interest in the place searched or property seized”).
66.   Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the 
Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 826-27 (2004).  “One virtue of the Fourth Amendment's 
property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy.” Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013); 
Renee M. Pomerance, Redefining Privacy in the Face of New Technologies: Data Mining and the Threat 
to the ‘Inviolate Personality,’ 9 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 273, 290-92 (2005). 
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which a person can exercise control.67 In the absence of a privacy zone, 
reasonable expectations of privacy in each circumstance become difficult 
to resolve as well as difficult to articulate as precedent for future cases.68
R v. Cole is a notable attempt of the Court’s effort to extend 
privacy rights beyond physical spaces.69 In that case, the defendant was a 
teacher who accessed child pornography from a work-issued laptop.70 After 
a school computer technician discovered the pornography, the principal 
seized the defendant’s laptop and handed the hard drive over to the police.71
The computer policy at the school allowed employees to use laptops both 
for work and “incidental personal use.”72 While the Court acknowledged the 
school’s ownership of the laptop, the defendant claimed that the seizure of 
the laptop without a warrant violated Section Eight.73 The Court agreed, 
finding that the police violated Section Eight when they searched the hard 
drive.74 Unlike in Sanelli where the defendant divulged the incriminating 
information within a circumscribed area (i.e. an apartment),75 the defendant 
in Cole accrued an incriminating search history from his usage of the laptop 
in diverse locations.76 The breach of Section Eight, therefore, occurred not 
from an intrusion on a privacy zone but from the intrusion on the defendant’s 
right to personal autonomy over sensitive information.77 In the context of 
information privacy, the Court stated that the greater the extent to which the 
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67.   See Edwards, [1996] 1 S.C.R. at 45 (considering whether defendant had “right to admit or 
exclude others from the place” in determining “reasonable privacy expectation”). See
 R v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. ,  paras. 30-31. 
68. See Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid: The Protection of 
Privacy in Public Places, 50 U. TORONTO L. J. 305, 330 (2000) (“By transcending the limits of sensory 
perception, technology has almost limitless potential to contravene normal expectations of privacy in 
both public and private places.”). 
69.  R v. Cole, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34 (Can.).
70.  Id. at paras. 3-5. 
71.  Id.
72.  Id. at para. 4.
73.  Id. at paras. 50-51, 65-66. As Karen Eltis notes, Cole was a departure from prior case law 
that had considered the defendant’s ownership in the property dispositive as to the issue of whether the 
defendant had a cognizable privacy interest. Karen Eltis, Piecing Together Jones, A.B. and Cole:
Towards a “Proportional” Model of Shared Accountability in Workplace Privacy, 18 CANADIAN LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 493, 507 (2014).
74. 
Cole,[2012]3S.C.R.,paras.81
75.  Sanelli, [1990] 1 S.C.R., para. 4. 
76.  R. v. Cole, [2011] 105 O.R. (3d) 253, para. 16 (overruled by Cole, [2012] 3 S.C.R. at 34) 
(“Teachers were permitted to use their computer for personal use and to take it home during weekends 
and vacations.”).
77.  Cole, [2012] 3 S.C.R. at paras. 45-46. The protection of privacy as autonomy rests at the 
intersection of Section Seven and Section Eight of the Charter. Section Seven guarantees the right “to life, 
liberty and security of the person.” Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, at §7 (U.K.). In R v. Mortgentaler, Justice Wilson 
interpreted this provision to “guarantee[ ] to every individual a degree of personal autonomy over 
important decisions intimately affecting their private lives" and that the “security of the person” extends 
to the individual’s psychological integrity. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, para. 299 (Can.) (Wilson, J. concurring). 
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information constitutes a “biographical core of personal information,” the 
more suspect the intrusion becomes under Section Eight.78
While Cole expanded privacy zones outward from a concrete 
space, its holding is somewhat limited because the Court found that only 
the police processing of the data violated Section Eight.79 Citing the 
“statutory duty” of the principle to “maintain a safe school environment,” 
the Court found that administrators did not violate Section Eight when they 
seized the defendant’s laptop and searched its contents.80 Moreover, the 
Court held that the administrators would not have acted improperly by 
informing police of their findings, thereby allowing the police to obtain a 
search warrant for the data.81 While Section Eight imposes restraints only 
on state actors, Canadian courts have defined broadly the instances in 
which a private actor acts as a state agent.82 The Supreme Court of Canada 
has found that school administrators “constitute a part of government” and 
thus Section Eight protections apply.83 Schools, however, are also special 
environments that are subject to lesser privacy protections.84 Thus, it is 
unclear how the Court would have treated the administrator conduct 
outside the context of education.
R v. Cuttell provides some guidance.85 In that case, the Ontario Court 
of Justice held that a service provider that gave police the name and address 
of a defendant suspected of sharing child pornography violated the 
defendant’s Section Eight right.86 Because the address and name of the 
defendant constituted core private information, police could not use a 
service provider as a proxy for an intrusive search that the police could not 
otherwise conduct without a warrant.87 So long as a service provider 
performed what essentially amounted to a governmental function (i.e. 
voluntarily cooperating with police in a criminal investigation), the service 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
78.  Cole, [2012] 3 S.C.R., paras. 46-59. “The fact that the school board had acquired lawful 
possession of the laptop for its own administrative purposes did not vest in the police a delegated or 
derivative power to appropriate and search the computer for the purposes of a criminal investigation.”
Id. at para. 67; see Plant, 3 S.C.R., paras. 27-28.
79.  Cole, [2012] 3 S.C.R., para. 73. 
80.  Id. at para. 62. 
81.  Id. at para. 73.
82.  See Cuttell, [2009] 247 C.C.C. (3d), para. 50. (“[W]hen the police request private information 
from a third party such as an ISP in a criminal investigation, the ISP may well become an agent of the 
state whose decision to disclose information will be subject to scrutiny under s.8 of the Charter.”).
83.  See R v. M. (M.R.), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393, paras. 24-25 (Can.). 
84.  “Teachers and administrators must be able to respond quickly and effectively to problems 
that arise in their school. When a school official conducts a search of or seizure from a student, a warrant 
is not required. The absence of a warrant in these circumstances will not lead to a presumption that the 
search was unreasonable.” Id. at para. 45. 
85.  Cuttell, [2009] 247 C.C.C. (3d) at paras. 50, 55. 
86.  Id. at para. 59. 
87.  Id. at paras. 5-12, 59.   
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providers’ disclosures of personal information to the police is the 
equivalent of a state action under Section Eight.88
Because service provider employees are subject to Section Eight 
constraints, Canadian courts have begun to factor the terms of agreements 
between users and service providers into the REP analysis.89 In R v. 
Gomboc the Court addressed whether law enforcement were entitled to 
obtain data regarding electrical output at a home suspected of being used 
as a marijuana growing site without a search warrant.90 The police 
requested the electrical data from the utility provider pursuant to a 
municipal ordinance that required providers to disclose information “to a 
peace officer for the purpose of investigating an offence if the disclosure 
is not contrary to the express request of the customer.”91 Since the 
defendant in Gomboc had not opted out of the disclosure provision, the 
Crown argued that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy with 
respect to his utility information.92 The Court accepted this argument with 
some qualification.93 Due to the “multitudinous forms of information” 
that comprise utility agreements and the limited opportunity for consumer 
bargaining, the Court decided to treat the terms as persuasive rather than 
dispositive of relative privacy rights.94 Additionally, the Court found that 
the defendant did not have a strong privacy interest in electrical 
consumption data because the information did not reveal intimate details 
of the defendant’s life.95
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88.  Id. at para. 50. See also Royal Bank v. Welton, [2008] 89 O.R. 3d 532, paras. 49-51 (Can. 
Ont. C.A.) (finding that, while the sharing of information between private entities is not restricted by 
Section Eight, a private entity’s sharing of information to police can constitute a breach of Section Eight). 
89.  See Cole, [2012] 3 S.C.R., para. 52; Spencer, [2014] 2 S.C.R., paras. 53-67; Gomboc, [2010] 
3 S.C.R. passim; R v. Cuttell, [2009] 247 C.C.C. (3d) passim; R v. Mahmood, [2008] 236 C.C.C. (3d) 
passim.
90.  Gomboc, [2010] 3 S.C.R., paras. 1-2. 
91.  Id. at para. 31. 
92.  The Gomboc Court’s analysis is a clear example of the oft-cited circularity of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test. The Court states that the law recognizes that a person does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the utility information because utilities are subject to extensive 
regulation. See Renee M. Pomerance, Shedding Light on the Nature of Heat: Defining Privacy in the 
wake of R. v. Tessling, (2004), 23 C.R. (6th) 229, at 3; Richard Posner, The Uncertain Protection of 
Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 S.CT. REV. 173, 188 (“And it is circular to say that there is no 
invasion of privacy unless the individual whose privacy is invaded had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy; whether he will or will not have such an expectation will depend on what the legal rule is.”). 
While the Court aims at creating normative rather than descriptive privacy protections, its analysis 
depends on the state of the law at the time to elect the appropriate normative constraints. American search 
and seizure law shares this same logical inconsistency. For example, in California v. Carney, the 
Supreme Court of the United States justifies the reduced privacy expectations in an automobile in party 
by the “pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways.” 471 U.S. 386, 392 
(1985).
93. Gomboc, [2010] 3 S.C.R., paras. 32-33. 
94. Id.
95. Id. at paras. 42-43.
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In Spencer the Court expressed reservation about deferring to 
legislation when assessing the reasonableness of a search.96 The Court 
eschewed an analysis that would treat PIPEDA as a core variable in 
assessing a reasonable expectation of privacy.97 Because the purpose of 
Section Eight is to impose a check on legislative power, PIPEDA cannot 
be used as a factor to weigh against the existence of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.98 However, the Court in Gomboc noted that the 
legislative and contractual framework may be a persuasive consideration 
in determining whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.99 In 
regards to contractual provisions, the Court additionally noted hesitation 
when such terms were vague and operated as essentially contracts of 
adhesion.100 However, both Spencer and Gomboc leave unclear the 
precise relationship of search and seizure law with existing legislation 
and contractual obligations. 
PART II: ANALYSIS 
?
Informational privacy raises unique questions in search and seizure 
law. Most importantly, it is unclear whether the REP test is even workable 
in the data privacy context.101 Resolution of this question is necessary 
before addressing the broader issue regarding the appropriate normative 
constraints of Section Eight and PIPEDA.  
Section Eight data privacy cases have reiterated the importance of 
enforcing norms independent of existing legal obligations.102 For this 
reason, the Supreme Court of Canada has eschewed strict reliance on 
property rights and rejected an interpretation of PIPEDA allowing 
legislatures to unilaterally draw privacy boundaries.103 Instead the Court 
has sought to protect data privacy rights by weighing several factors 
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96.
The reasonable expectation of privacy standard is normative rather than 
simply descriptive… Thus, while the analysis is sensitive to the factual 
context, it is inevitably “laden with value judgments which are made from 
the independent perspective of the reasonable and informed person who is 
concerned about the long-term consequences of government action for the 
protection of privacy." 
Spencer, [2014] 2 S.C.R. at 18-19 (quoting R v. Patrick, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 579, para. 14 (Can.)). 
97.  Id. at para. 54 (“There is no doubt that the contractual and statutory framework may be 
relevant to, but not necessarily determinative of whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.”).  
98.  Id. at paras. 62-63. 
99.  Id. at para. 54.
100.  Id.
101.  Orin Kerr has taken the position that Katz is an unworkable model in the data privacy context. 
Instead of relying on judicially imposed normative constraints, Kerr has argued that data privacy should 
be largely left to legislatures. Kerr, supra note 66, at 858-60.  
102.  See Spencer, [2014] 2 S.C.R., para. 18. 
103.  See Spencer, [2014] 2 S.C.R., paras. 53-55. 
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including, most importantly, the extent to which the information would 
tend to reveal a “biographical core of information.”104 While this approach 
acknowledges the reality that digital records can be as sensitive as 
information gleaned through a physical search of a home, it nonetheless 
suffers from an arbitrariness similar to the divining of privacy 
expectations from property rights.105 Both Cole and Spencer emphasize 
that people have a privacy right in their use of technologies that ordinarily 
involve divulging personal information.106 This normative lens, however, 
is both over- and under-inclusive. For example, a person who uses such 
technologies to broadcast every detail about his personal life—including 
his or her criminal conduct—would be protected under Section Eight, 
even though such transparency is not normal.107 Conversely, a particularly 
private person may share data online that he or she, but not a reasonable 
person (as determined by the Court), believes is sensitive.108 In both these 
cases Section Eight might fail to account for the intrusiveness of a given 
search.109
 The disparity between actual and normative privacy practices is 
particularly egregious in the data privacy realm. Physical property has 
concrete boundaries that make instances of trespass readily 
identifiable.110 No one would question, for example, that a Section Eight 
seizure occurs when officers carry off a defendant’s computer. Moreover, 
even in cases in which courts must weigh relative property interests 
among several owners, the diversity of norms is nowhere near as immense 
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104.  Id. at para. 27. 
105.  See Orin Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 348 
(2012)):
Estimating the frequency of technological surveillance practices is 
essentially impossible for most people (including most judges). 
Surveillance practices tend to be hidden, and few understand the relevant 
technologies… Some people will guess that privacy invasions are 
common. Others will guess that they are rare. But exceedingly few will 
know the truth, which makes probabilistic beliefs a poor basis for Fourth 
Amendment protection. 
106.  See Cole, [2012] 3 S.C.R. passim; Spencer, [2014] 2 S.C.R. passim.
107.  See Abril, supra note 12, at 698. 
108.  See id.
109.  See id.
110.  See Gianclaudio Malgieri, "Ownership" of Customer (Big) Data in the European Union: 
Quasi-Property As Comparative Solution?, 20 No. 5 J. INTERNET L. 3, 10-11 (2016): 
Creating a property right around a res necessarily requires determining 
the boundaries of the res that is being endowed with exclusionary 
significance. While defining the res in relation to tangible resources poses 
few problems, defining the boundaries of the res in relation to intangibles 
is a difficult exercise that involves significant administrative and judicial 
costs. Hence, a key problem will be that vesting a property right in 
personal data implies that “someone” must define precisely what is worth 
a property right.”(citations omitted).
See also Sonja R. West, The Story of Us: Resolving the Face-off Between Autobiographical Speech 
and Information Privacy, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 589, 615-18 (2010). 
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as the variety of information-sharing habits among modern technology 
users.111 The defendant in Cole, for example, might have used his 
workplace laptop primarily to view child-pornography or to split his time 
between viewing child-pornography and sending personal 
communications to his family.112 In either case, the presumption that a 
work-issued computer contains data revealing a core of sensitive 
information might miss the mark.113
Canadian courts have responded to norm variance in informational 
privacy rights in part by transitioning to a more descriptive analysis of 
privacy expectations.114 Thus, in Gomboc the Court found the regulatory 
scheme that governed the disclosure of electrical data persuasive.115 If
Section Eight ought to provide independent constraints on intrusive 
investigative practices, deference to existing legislation runs the risk of 
validating rather than curtailing legislative abuses of privacy rights.116
PIPEDA, for example, contains numerous law enforcement exceptions that 
dramatically limit user privacy rights against private service providers.117
Judicial deference to these exceptions would dramatically limit the scope 
of privacy rights users can retain against the government.  
Though the current judicial treatment of information privacy is 
flawed in the information privacy context, the REP test can be salvaged 
provided courts develop a privacy model flexible enough to respond to 
variance in privacy norms.118 Indeed, “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
is a mutable term and can be molded quite easily to a variety of 
frameworks.119 While some scholars, including Kerr, have expressed 
concern that courts are less capable than legislatures in keeping up with 
privacy trends against a background of rapid technological change, 120 the 
languid pace of privacy legislation  weighs against reducing the role of 
courts in enforcing privacy boundaries. 
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111.  See Abril, supra note 12, at 698; Solove, supra note 11, at 41-42.
112.  See Cole, [2012] 3 S.C.R. passim.
113.  See R. v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R., para. 54 (“So we must keep in mind that the real issue is 
the potentially broad invasion of privacy that may, but not inevitably will, result from law enforcement 
searches of cell phones.”); see also Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2496-797 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting the lack 
of nuance in the rule that police may seize a cellphone incident to an arrest but cannot search its contents 
without a warrant). 
114.  Gomboc, [2010] 3 S.C.R., para. 31; Spencer, [2014] 2 S.C.R., paras. 53-67. 
115.  Id.
116.  See Mayeda, supra note 7, at 46-48. 
117.  Id.
118.  See Ric Simmons, Ending the Zero-Sum Game: How to Increase the Productivity of the 
Fourth Amendment, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 549, 589-90 (2013) (rejecting a privacy law framework 
that would freeze the Katz doctrine in its current form and allow legislation to handle future privacy 
issues because “the reasonable expectations standard is meant to be a flexible one” and “ought to adjust 
as the amount of privacy that we expect evolves”) (internal quotations omitted). 
119.  Id.
120.  See Kerr, supra note 66, at 858-60. 
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Some scholars have argued that courts should enforce data privacy 
rights through a modified property framework.121 As previously 
mentioned, The EU Directive and PIPEDA omit any mention of who owns 
personal data.122 Instead, the enactments simply govern the circumstances 
under which service providers can disclose certain types of personal 
information.123 The appeal of a property model for data privacy rests in the 
strength of the remedy.124 Unlike liability rules in contract law, property 
law affords an owner injunctive relief when trespass occurs.125 Such relief 
would restrict service providers from weighing ex ante the costs and 
benefits of personal data disclosure.126 Since property rights track the user’s 
intent to control, they are intimately linked to the owner’s freedom against 
unwarranted intrusion.127 Finally, since Canadian courts arguably still 
conceptualize privacy in terms of discrete, geographically limited zones, 
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121.  See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2094-
96 (2004) (propounding a “hybrid inalienability” model of data privacy that allows users “to share, as 
well as to place limitations on, the future use of their personal information”); Lawrence Lessig, The
Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 63-64 (1999) (presenting a property-based 
model of data privacy in which people own their data and can negotiate the price at which they are 
willing to relinquish the privacy in that data).   
122.  See Maxiener, supra note 29. The EU recently adopted the General Data Protection 
Regulation to replace the Directive. The regulation recognizes several property entitlements in data 
including the “right to be forgotten” and the “right of portability.” Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), arts. 17-18, 2016 (O.J. (L 119) 1, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/reform/files/regulation_oj_en.pdf; Its provisions will come into 
effect on May 25, 2018. Id. at art. 99; see also Malgieri, supra note 110, at 3, 6. 
123.  See Maxeiner, supra note 29, at 97; Nisker, supra note 23, at 318. 
124.  For a thorough explanation of the distinctions between property and liability remedies, see 
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090-91 (1972). 
125.  See Id. Vera Bergelson argues that such relief could take the form of damage awards above 
the amount of actual damages. It's Personal But Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal 
Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379 (2003). This could take the form of a per diem fine or, in the 
case of an unauthorized transfer of personal information, a fixed penalty amount. Id.
126.  See Jane B. Baron, Property As Control: The Case of Information, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 367, 380-81 (2012) (“Because a property rule would bar use of personal information 
without prior negotiation, it provides exactly the sort of control that has been sought to counteract the 
dystopia of ubiquitous-but-secret information flows.”); Mark A. Lemley, Contracting Around Liability 
Rules, 100 CAL. L. REV. 463, 484 (2012) (“Property rules are all-or-nothing results; they don't allow the 
sorts of tailoring that liability rules do. In other words, a property rule sacrifices the potential accuracy 
of liability rules in the hopes of creating better ex ante incentives.”). 
127.   For a more thorough explanation of the relationship between property and freedom, see 
Nadav Shoked, The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE L.J. 437, 446-53 (2014):
To effectuate this innate capacity for choice immune from the interference of 
others, external objects of choice must be accessible to the individual. 
Therefore, each person must have an entitlement to external objects: a right 
rendering an object available for the exclusive exercise of her capacity for 
choice. In other words, holding an asset, whose manner of use cannot be dictated 
to the individual by others, is a prerequisite for the individual's freedom.  
(citations omitted). 
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the conceptual underpinnings of a property-based model might already be 
in place.128
A property model of data privacy suffers from several 
disadvantages. First, it could have the unintended effect of exacerbating 
data privacy dilemmas by allowing users to sell their rights to personal 
information without understanding the privacy implications.129 Because
one of the core sticks in the bundle of property rights is freedom of 
alienation, a user might have no recourse to stop a buyer’s re-sale of the 
data to unintended third parties.130 Paul Schwartz has proposed a “hybrid 
alienability model” that would permit people to freely alienate personal 
data but retain an option to block further transfers of that data to 
“unaffiliated entities.”131 The problem with this model is that it is unduly 
inefficient when the information is sold to entities far-removed from the 
original sale.132 Moreover, limited transferability would undoubtedly raise 
service provider costs and would thus undermine the ability of some people 
to value convenience more than privacy.133
A second disadvantage of the property model is that the contours of 
the property right are unclear. Concrete boundaries of traditional property 
ensure that owners can make transactions without encountering substantial 
confusion over the rights exchanged.134 Such transparency is almost entirely 
absent in the information privacy context. Because even seemingly 
innocuous data might be aggregated into full-scale profiles, users would 
likely misjudge the scope of the personal information they disclose.135 The
lack of clear property boundaries in data also raises the question about 
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128.  See Kerr, supra note 66, at 826-27. 
129.  See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1137-
1138 (2000) (“Information privacy goals may not be achievable unless the default rule of the new property 
rights regime limits transferability.”); see also Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information 
Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1303 (2000) (explaining the property model’s “reliance on alienability 
and easy waiver tend to vest control over personal data in the data miner rather than the data's subject”). 
130. See Litman, supra note 129, at 1301: 
[P]rivacy is one of those things that many people don't believe they really need 
until they find themselves with something to keep secret. If easy assignment is 
the rule, they may no longer have the power to preserve their secrecy; even if 
they could, the exceptional nature of their asserting a privacy claim will tip off 
those from whom this is a secret that there is an interesting secret there. So, if 
someone who is deemed to have waived any property rights in the information 
supplied to businesses in return for product discounts should suddenly find 
himself diagnosed with hemorrhoids, or herpes, or HIV, he may have no 
practical way to recapture his secrecy. 
131. See Schwartz, supra note 121, at 2059-60. 
132. See Baron, supra note 126, at 381-82 (“If individuals have property rights to personal 
information, those individuals will determine as an initial matter whether to sell that information for 
money or barter it for services such as access to a website. But they will not be able to determine the use 
made of that information once it is in the hands of another.”). 
133.  See generally Abril, supra note 12. 
134.  See Baron, supra note 126, at 380-85.   
135.  Id. at 381. 
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whether a property-rule could even work in practice.136 If a service provider 
“trespasses” on personal information, it would be difficult to remedy the 
breach through an injunction when the core damage—exposing personal 
information—has already been realized.137
A privacy model based on contract law is a more effective 
alternative to regulating competing data privacy norms.138 Because 
contract law allows people to negotiate and individualize the privacy 
rights they wish to retain, it would provide a much closer approximation 
of reasonable privacy expectations.139 Many individuals who value 
convenience and publicity would negotiate for decreased privacy 
expectations, while those particularly keen on preserving private 
information would opt for higher privacy settings.140 The former group 
would assume the risk that their communications would expose them to 
liability for misconduct and the latter group would relinquish some 
benefits of modern communication.141 While Canadian courts have 
rejected a formal “risk analysis,” the rejection has largely been directed 
towards assumption of hidden risks.142 In such scenarios, the government 
deprives the individual of any meaningful ability to direct his or her 
communications to discrete individuals.143 An opportunity to negotiate 
privacy expectations mitigates this risk, because the user can make an 
informed decision about the types of data that will reach people or entities. 
The contract model has several advantages over a data ownership 
model. Because it governs rules for informational disclosure ex ante, a
contract model avoids the vexing problem of determining the scope of the 
property right.144 Unlike property law, contract law contains doctrines 
(e.g. unconscionability) that afford users more protection against 
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136.  See Abril, supra note 12, at 707. 
137.  Id.
138.  Id. at 706 (“Private rulemaking in the form of express user-to-user confidentiality contracts 





142.  See Sanelli, [1990] 1 S.C.R., para. 24 (“A society which exposed us, at the whim of the state, 
to the risk of having a permanent electronic recording made of our words every time we opened our 
mouths might be superbly equipped to fight crime, but would be one in which privacy no longer had any 
meaning.”).
143.  Id.
144.   
When there is an information asymmetry, however, and one party knows more 
about the value of the property than another, or, as is even more common, the 
parties know their own valuations but not the valuation ascribed to the property 
by the other party, then it is likely that the property rule coupled with the 
information asymmetry may cause the parties to miss what would otherwise be 
an efficient “Coasean” trade. In such cases, liability rules may be more efficient.  
Edward J. Janger, Muddy Property: Generating and Protecting Information Privacy Norms in 
Bankruptcy, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1801, 1845-46 (2003) (citation omitted). 
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deceptive or manipulative practices.145 In this way, contract law is better 
at “[taking] into account cognitive difficulties individuals may have in 
assessing the risks of certain transactions” as well as “[providing] 
protections to overcome these cognitive problems.”146
The main obstacle to implementing a contractual-model of data 
privacy is that many service agreements afford users little room for 
negotiation.147 In Spencer the court expressed reluctance about including 
contractual terms in the REP calculus because such agreements are often 
contracts of adhesion.148 Absent the ability of users to freely negotiate, a 
contract could inaccurately match the privacy expectations of users with 
the actual privacy practices of service providers.149 According to Karl 
Llewellyn, a standard form agreement creates two contracts: (1) a contract 
consisting of core terms that both parties freely negotiate and (2) a 
contract consisting of boilerplate terms a party does not read on the 
assumption the terms do not adversely affect the core terms.150 Such 
contracts can only be valid if the boilerplate terms do not impair the 
meaning of the core terms and are not themselves unreasonable or 
unfair.151
But privacy policies tend to be so vague, complex and 
inconspicuous that ordinary users typically lack knowledge of the 
terms.152 In part, this can explain the disconnect between popular desire 
for greater online privacy and actual consumer choices individuals 
make.153 Thus while people are generally willing to pay a premium for 
more privacy in their transactions, few people are willing to read the 
boilerplate terms that are hallmarks of service provider contracts.154
Under Llewellyn’s model, those boilerplate terms are unfair when they 
distort the available information necessary to negotiate over core terms 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
145.  See Samuelson, supra note 129, at 1156. 
146.  Id.
147.  Mark MacAulay, Contracts, Legislative Frameworks and the Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy: Rethinking Section 8 in the Service Provision Context, 20 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 131-132 
(2015).
148.  R v. Spencer, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212, paras. 54-55 (Can.). 
149.  See MacAulay, supra note 147, at 131-132. 
150.  KARL L. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 -371 (1960); 
see Shelley Smith, Reforming the Law of Adhesion Contracts: A Judicial Response to the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1035, 1097 (2010).
151.  Id. at 371; see ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Terms of 
use are no less a part of ‘the product’ than are the size of the database and the speed with which the 
software compiles listings. Competition among vendors, not judicial revision of a package's contents, is 
how consumers are protected in a market economy.”). 
152.  See MacAulay, supra note 147.
153.  See Holland, supra note 11, at 893-94.
154.  See Janice Y Tsai, Serge Egelman, Lorrie Cranor & Alessandro Acquisti, The Effect of Online 
Privacy Information on Purchasing Behavior: An Experimental Study, 22 INFO. SYS. RESEARCH 254, 
263 (2011); see Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1409, 1434-
36 (2011). 
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such as price.155 The failure of service agreements to adequately signal 
privacy terms is a problem of incentives. Personal information is a 
valuable resource to service providers as the data affords marketers 
“unprecedented power to find new customers.”156 Service providers are 
unwilling to provide users increased privacy at the expense of economic 
benefit, at least when there is no clear signal increased privacy affects the 
demand for a product.157
One method to alter privacy practices is through regulations that 
force service providers to more clearly state privacy terms in standard 
form contracts.158 Currently, PIPEDA’s reasonableness standard places 
the burden on service providers to gauge whether their practices are 
compliant based on the totality of the circumstances.159 Because of 
PIPEDA’s lack of firm regulations, service providers can shift the burden 
on consumers to opt-out of intrusive data collection efforts.160
Implementing a mandatory opt-in rule for service provider data collection 
could increase the likelihood users view and understand the privacy terms 
in their contracts.161 Introducing a provision requiring service providers 
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155. Llewellyn, supra note 150, at 370-371.
156. Jared S. Livingston, Invasion Contracts: The Privacy Implications of Terms of Use 
Agreements in the Online Social Media Setting, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 591, 596 (2011); see
Rubinstein, supra note 154, at 1439-40 (“[A]d targeting is valuable and privacy safeguards may increase 
opportunity costs to the extent that they diminish the economic value of online advertising, thereby 
creating an investment disincentive for firms dependent on advertising revenues.”). 
157. Steven Hetcher, Changing the Social Meaning of Privacy in Cyberspace, 15 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 149, 199-201 (2001) (explaining that, because providing greater privacy will, in the short term, 
forgo an immediate benefit, service providers must receive adequate signals from users to induce the 
entities to accept a short-term loss for a long-term gain). 
158. As an example, the Federal Trade Commission has implemented regulations designed to 
prohibit contract terms that are “unfair and deceptive.” Alan M. White, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN.
L. & POL'Y REV. 233, 258-59 (2002); see Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 427-29 (2014) (“The adoption of transparency policies could allow 
companies to more freely operate while protecting consumers by allowing the FTC to bring enforcement 
actions when a promise of transparency is not upheld.”).
159.  See Fric, supra note 34, at 152. 
160.  See OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA, Finding Under the Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) (Apr. 7, 2015).  
It is important to note that while our Office's OBA Guidelines provide that opt-
out consent may be appropriate in certain circumstances, they do not render opt-
out consent the default for all behaviorally targeted advertising. In determining 
the appropriate form of consent, organizations should be careful to consider all 
of the circumstances surrounding their advertising programs, including those 
factors outlined in this report. 
161. See Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig's Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, 
Privacy-Control, and Fair Information Practices, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 743, 784-85 (2000). (explaining 
that the EU’s recently passed General Data Protection Regulation mandates that service providers obtain 
express consent for data collection and use); See Art. 7, General Data Protection Regulation, 2012/0011 
(COD). The consent of the “data subject,” moreover, must be “freely given, specific, informed and 
unambiguous.” Id. This is a modification of the previous data directive that allowed for implied consent 
under certain circumstances. Id. at art. 7 (“[T]he controller shall be able to demonstrate that the data 
subject has consented to processing of his or her personal data.”). 
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to clearly and conspicuously state the types of data collected and the 
circumstances under which the data can be shared would increase use 
notice as well.162 Finally, legislatures could mandate that service 
providers offer several tiers of privacy settings and enforce non-compliant 
providers with administrative penalties.163 Under this scheme, service 
providers must pass on the opportunity cost they would incur from a 
reduction in data collection by increasing the service price for consumers 
who elect higher privacy options.164 This scheme would fulfill what 
Richard Posner describes as the cost of privacy, or the cost society must 
bear when individuals decide to conceal their conduct from others.165
Since affording people greater privacy protections in their 
communications might obfuscate their wrongdoing, the law can reduce 
this moral hazard by increasing the price of services for people who elect 
a high privacy preference.166
While regulation is needed to increase the visibility of privacy 
terms, Canadian courts should enforce Section Eight in a way that promotes 
greater bargaining over privacy terms. Thus, courts should assign more 
weight in the REP analysis to policies that are clear and allow users to opt-
in to a variety of privacy options.167 In making this analysis courts should 
avoid placing too much emphasis on the quantity of regulations as the 
Supreme Court of Canada did in Gomboc.168 Obscure regulations, though 
numerous, are unlikely to signal users about privacy terms.169 Instead courts 
should primarily consider whether an ordinary person reading the service 
agreement would be alerted to the privacy terms and have some opportunity 
to choose among privacy options.170 In cases involving service agreements 
with unclear terms or lack of choice among tiers of privacy settings, courts 
should place little emphasis on contractual terms when assessing the 
reasonableness of the privacy expectation. Under these circumstances, it 
would be appropriate for courts to emphasize, as they currently do, the 
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Breaches by Standardizing Internet Privacy Policies, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 104, 109 (2008) 
(proposing mandated use of standard privacy policies that allow users to elect tiers of privacy settings at 
or above industry standards). 
164.  Id.
165.  See Posner, supra note 13, at 233 (“The wish for privacy expresses a desire . . . to control 
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166.  Id.
167.  Colleen McCullough argues that courts should determine the validity of boilerplate contracts 
in terms of their understandability. Unconscionability As A Coherent Legal Concept, Note, 164 U. PA.
L. REV. 779 (2016). Under this model, the “offeror cannot impose on the offeree terms either that a 
reasonable person would not expect, or that, even if expected, would impose costs on third parties 
similarly situated to the offeree.” Id. at 805. 
168. See R. v. Gomboc, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 211, paras. 32-33 (Can.). 
169. See R v. Spencer, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212, para. 54 (Can.).
170. Gomboc, [2010] 3 S.C.R., paras. 32-33. 
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potentiality that the technology contains a biographical core of 
information.171 This assumption might be wrong when measured against a 
defendant’s usage habits, but it would provide at least some approximation 
of the privacy expectation. 
CONCLUSION 
?
Canadian data privacy law has struggled to adapt to the Big Data 
paradigm in which government and private actors collect and share 
personal information. PIPEDA—the primary data privacy statute—has 
accomplished little legislatively in restricting data sharing between law 
enforcement and service providers. Additionally, Courts have yet to adopt 
an adequate framework for assessing reasonable privacy expectations 
under Section Eight that recognizes wide-variations in data privacy 
norms. Because courts have typically only looked at the potentiality that 
technology will be used in certain ways, judges are apt to overlook the 
actual data privacy practices of individuals. By shifting towards a 
contractual expectation of privacy, Canadian courts can more adeptly 
handle the wide-variation in privacy norms and thus more accurately 
gauge reasonable privacy expectations. Accomplishing this transition will 
depend on increasing the opportunities for consumers and service 
providers to negotiate on privacy terms. Legislation that requires service 
providers to clearly state the terms of privacy policies and provide users 
a choice among privacy settings will increase the likelihood users will 
make an informed choice about the risks and benefits of exchanging data. 
Courts in turn ought to interpret compliant service provider agreements 
as highly persuasive in assessing the reasonableness of a search of data. 
In doing so they can better capture actual privacy expectations and thereby 
fulfill the purpose of Section Eight. 
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